First contain the incident and preserve evidence. File recovery can sometimes locate remaining deleted content, but recovering a file is different from decrypting ransomware output or removing the attacker. Do not reconnect backups or recovered files to a computer still suspected of compromise.

Contain before restoring
On an organization device, notify the incident-response team and follow its response plan. Isolate affected systems from networks and shared storage using the approved process. Preserve the ransom note, observed filenames, event timing, and relevant logs. The CISA StopRansomware Guide provides incident-response guidance, including isolation and evidence considerations.
Do not run another suspected program to identify it, erase the disk for a clean start, or attach the only offline backup to the affected computer. Power decisions can affect volatile evidence; coordinate them with the response team rather than applying a universal shutdown rule.
On a personal computer, disconnect the affected device from the network and avoid attaching backups to it. Use an unaffected device to contact a trusted security professional or follow the CISA guidance. Keep the ransom note and any observed error details for assessment.
Classify the copies you actually have
| Observed data | Useful route |
|---|---|
| Clean backup from before the incident | Restore into a verified clean environment |
| Original file deleted, with readable storage remaining | Consider a preserved-source recovery scan |
| File content encrypted by ransomware | Seek a legitimate matching decryption route or clean earlier copy |
| File overwritten or erased | Pursue other copies; ordinary recovery cannot reverse the overwrite |
| File merely renamed or hidden | Inspect preserved copies without assuming that changes decrypt content |
Do not infer encryption solely from an extension. Conversely, changing the extension back does not decrypt encrypted bytes. Keep original incident material untouched and evaluate copies.
Restore known-good data into a clean environment
Have the response team determine a safe environment and restoration point. Check the backup’s date, scope, readability, and whether changes had already synchronized into it. A cloud folder can contain the encrypted revision as well as—or instead of—the original. Inspect actual available history rather than treating synchronization as an offline backup.
Restore needed data separately, verify it, and retain incident evidence until the relevant owners finish their work. Application installation, credentials, and persistence removal need their own recovery process.
Use file recovery for retained deleted originals
Where authorized and the source is readable, XRecovery can scan for remaining deleted files and export them to separate storage. Use a trusted environment and preserved source appropriate to the incident. Preview and verify candidate contents; a scan finding a familiar filename does not establish that its data predates encryption.
XRecovery’s listed file-repair functions address damaged files with retained content. They do not decrypt files encrypted by ransomware. If no clean original remains, seek security-vendor or incident-response guidance for the identified family. Keep encrypted and partial files for possible later analysis, but do not label them successfully recovered merely because they were copied or displayed in a hex viewer. Verified file recovery and a resolved security incident are separate outcomes.